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CREATING NORMS OF ATTORNEY 
CONDUCT IN INTERNATIONAL 
TRIBUNALS: A CASE STUDY OF THE ICTY 
Judith A. McMorrow*
Abstract: Using the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a case study, this Article explores the merger of legal 
cultures at the ICTY. The ICTY was crafted in a high-stakes international 
environment and brings together lawyers and judges who have been 
trained and inculcated typically in a common law/adversarial system or a 
civil law/non-adversarial system. Lawyers and judges come to the ICTY 
not only with a distinct understanding of their roles within their home ju-
risdictions, but also with different skill sets. Merging the legal cultures has 
not always been smooth. By comparing how attorney-conduct norms are 
created in the United States—socialization, malpractice, market controls, 
regulatory processes, and procedural rules—with the practice at the 
ICTY, it becomes evident that the judges are the dominant source of 
norm creation in this international court. These norms are created, how-
ever, in an environment in which it appears that most of the substantive 
interaction between the judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel occurs 
in formal court settings. Future international courts would beneªt from 
additional discussion among the judicial, prosecutorial, and defense func-
tions as norms are created, including shared discussion about codes of 
conduct for judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. 
Introduction 
 The implementation of international war crimes tribunals in the 
1990s provides us an extraordinary laboratory to examine how legal 
cultures interact in the international arena. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is the most mature of these 
tribunals. With twelve years of experience, the tribunal has indicted 161 
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persons for serious violations.1 The ICTY is a substantial legal commu-
nity, with over 1000 employees (436 professionals), 200 interns, and 
185 consultants and individual contractors.2 These ªgures do not in-
clude defense counsel, who are treated as distinct from the ICTY—with 
some positive and negative consequences discussed below.3 The ICTY 
budget is around 270 million dollars, with about ªfteen percent of that 
budget devoted to legal aid.4 Crafted as a blend of the common 
law/adversarial and civil law/non-adversarial models, it has a predomi-
nantly adversarial methodology.5 The lawyers, judges, investigators, 
administrators, and support personnel, however, come from a range of 
backgrounds and training. Some come from a civil law tradition, in 
which the judge typically has the power to oversee a methodical investi-
gation in a search for truth.6 Many of the civil law-trained defense 
                                                                                                                      
1 ICTY at a Glance, Key Figures of ICTY Cases, http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/in- 
dex.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006). 
2 See The Secretary General, Twelfth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Com-
mitted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 247, delivered to the Security Council 
and the General Assembly (Aug. 15, 2005), http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2005/index. 
htm [hereinafter Twelfth Annual Report]. Through the 2005 budget, the ICTY has cost nearly 
one billion USD. Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and Its Completion Strategy: Efforts to 
Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and Their Tribunals, 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 82, 96 (2005). 
3 See David Tolbert, The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A Troubled Relationship, 37 New Eng. 
L. Rev. 975, 975 (2003). 
4 ICTY at a Glance, supra note 1; see also Tolbert, supra note 3, at 982–83. 
5 Rachel Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via: An Exercise in Law, Politics, and Diplomacy 95 (2004) (“[T]he drafters of the 
statute did not have time properly to consider the amalgamation of common law and civil 
law systems. Instead, the Statute, drafted primarily by common law experts, was greatly 
inºuenced by common law, but tempered with concessions to civil law.”). The heavy use of 
common law approaches has some interesting political consequences; see Pierre Hazan, 
Justice in a Time of War: The True Story Behind the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia 99 ( James T. Snyder trans., 2004) (“From the begin-
ning, the dominance of the common law system, followed by the Americans’ activism in 
the tribunal, has France convinced that Washington is ‘dictating’ justice in the former 
Yugoslavia.”); see also Gregory A. McClelland, A Non-Adversary Approach to International 
Criminal Tribunals, 26 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 1, 26–28 (2002) (arguing that ICTY 
and other international criminal tribunals would be more effective if they adopted proce-
dural features borrowed from the civil law/non-adversary tradition). 
Using a comparative law analysis, Maximo Langer examines the procedures of the 
ICTY and concludes that while the early ICTY procedures were predominantly adversarial, 
the more recent changes have moved toward a managerial judging model. Maximo 
Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 835, 
908 (2005). 
6 Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design as the Model for Em-
erging Legal Systems, 11 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 139, 139–40 (2004); Langer, supra note 
5, at 840. 
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counsel were trained under the former Yugoslavia socialist structure, 
with its own vision of legal process.7 Others come from a common 
law/adversarial model, in which the judge plays a much more passive 
role, and counsel are charged with developing and presenting facts and 
often deªne their role as an aggressive pursuit of that goal.8
 Creating a new legal system drawn from a variety of traditions 
along a spectrum of adversarial to inquisitorial also creates a range of 
related attorney conduct issues. A rich body of literature explores the 
comparative sociology of lawyers.9 Because these legal approaches re-
sult in strikingly different procedural and evidentiary rules, the lawyers 
and judges have different roles, resulting in quite different approaches 
to conªdentiality, conºicts of interest, duty to the courts, and the like.10 
For example, prosecutors from a civil law tradition might assume that it 
is quite appropriate to talk privately with judges about the case, conduct 
that would be forbidden in an adversarial model. Some U.S.-trained 
lawyers come with an adversarial aggressiveness that is jarring to lawyers 
outside the U.S. system (and sometimes jarring to those trained in the 
                                                                                                                      
7 See Mark S. Ellis, The Evolution of Defense Counsel Appearing Before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 949, 957 (2003) (“Many of 
the ‘qualiªed’ non-western attorneys were trained in the communist/socialist era, in a 
system that is antithetical to the Tribunal’s substantive and procedural laws.”). For exam-
ple, only recently has a detained person in the former Yugoslavia had the right to speak 
conªdentially to an attorney. Legal Department, World Bank, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia Legal and Judicial Diagnostic 12 (2002) [hereinafter World Bank Legal 
Report]. 
8 See generally, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct (2005) (setting out client-centered 
model); see also Antonio Cassese, The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 
585, 594 (2004) (“One should not underestimate the difªculty of getting judges from dif-
ferent legal traditions or with different backgrounds and training to get together and work 
smoothly, side by side.”). 
9 Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Ethics: The Coming of Age of Global and Comparative Perspec-
tives, 4 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 463, 479–81 (2005), and articles cited therein. See 
generally, e.g., Lawyers in Society (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1988) (three-
volume collection providing a comparative analysis on the legal professions of common 
and civil law countries); Lawyers in the Third World: Comparative and Developmen-
tal Perspectives (C.J. Dias, R. Luckham, D.O. Lynch & J.C.N. Paul eds., 1981); Carlos 
Wing-Hung Lo & Ed Snape, Lawyers in the People’s Republic of China: A Study of Commitment 
and Professionalization, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 433 (2005). 
10 Mark S. Ellis, Developing a Global Program for Enhancing Accountability: Key Ethical Tenets 
for the Legal Profession in the 21st Century, 54 S.C. L. Rev. 1011, 1013–14 (2003) (all codes 
examined contained principles on professional independence, diligence, conºict of inter-
est, and guidelines governing relations with the court, although speciªcs differed; there 
was less commonality on disciplinary measures, guidelines for lawyer/client communica-
tion, standards of personal integrity, conªdentiality, methods of ªnancial arrangements, 
and legal training); Langer, supra note 5, at 852–68 (discussing internal disposition of law-
yers from various systems and emergence of predominantly adversarial methodology at 
ICTY). 
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U.S. system as well). Even within common law traditions, expectations 
vary. For example, a British-trained defense counsel would not prepare 
a witness in advance of trial because it is forbidden in Great Britain.11 
For U.S.-trained defense counsel, however, it would be considered in-
appropriate not to interview and prepare a witness for the rigors of trial 
if there were an opportunity to do so.12 U.S. lawyers cannot directly 
contact a person who has counsel and must go through the designated 
counsel;13 British lawyers do not face that concern. Understanding 
one’s role shapes more subtle issues as well. For example, for U.S. law-
yers the client-attorney relationship is shaped by ethical values, includ-
ing a client-centered model that requires communication and provides 
the client signiªcant choices.14
 The merger of legal cultures involves more than merely training 
lawyers in the ways of the ICTY. The ICTY lawyers are licensed by their 
home jurisdictions and are required to comply with the obligations of 
that licensing jurisdiction, whether France, Serbia, Sweden, Canada, 
the United States, Great Britain, or another country. The shadow of the 
home licensing requirements is omnipresent for the lawyers and 
judges. Consequently, if the home jurisdiction forbids preparing wit-
nesses, the lawyer has a momentary choice of law concern: which rules 
will govern? Quite appropriately, the ICTY proceeds with the under-
standing that the rules of the tribunal prevail when assessing conduct 
before the ICTY.15 While it would be logical for the home jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                      
11 Colloquy, Rules of Conduct for Counsel and Judges: A Panel Discussion on English and 
American Practices, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 865, 868–73 (1994). 
12 The ICTY has also recognized that it would not be reasonable for defense counsel to 
compel attendance of a prospective witness without ªrst knowing what the witness would 
say. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Decision on Application For Subpoenas, ¶ 8 
( July 1, 2003) (forcing an uncooperative witness to testify without knowing the content of 
the testimony would be “contrary to the duty owed by counsel to their client to act skill-
fully and with loyalty”). 
13 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct § 4.2 (2006) (governing communication with 
person represented by counsel). 
14 See, e.g., id. § 1.2. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which serve as the tem-
plate for most U.S. codes of conduct for attorneys, speaks of the “client-attorney” relation-
ship instead of the lawyer-centered “attorney-client” relationship to reinforce that the cli-
ent (not the attorney) is the central actor in the relationship. 
15 See Int’l Criminal Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola-
tions of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 
1991, Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal, art. 4, 
ICTY Doc. IT/125/Rev. 2 ( June 29, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-
e/index.htm (“If there is any inconsistency between this Code and any other codes of prac-
tice and ethics governing counsel, the terms of this Code prevail in respect of counsel’s 
conduct before the Tribunal.”) [hereinafter ICTY Code of Conduct]. 
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to defer to the ICTY rules, the home jurisdiction is typically silent on 
this issue.16 The move toward having at least two defense counsel for 
defendants has eased some of these concerns because lawyers can as-
sign tasks within the team based on their individual competence and 
any residual concerns the lawyers have about home licensing require-
ments.17
 These different systems not only have different requirements for 
attorney conduct, they also develop different skill sets on the part of 
both lawyers and judges.18 For example, defense lawyers who come 
from a civil law tradition typically do not develop skills of cross-
examination or aggressive fact development. Most lawyers trained in a 
civil law tradition have not had as much opportunity to move from 
prosecutor to the defense role, which allows the lawyer to hone skills. 
The ICTY procedures are complex, resulting in lengthy and sometimes 
dull trials, punctuated by painful testimony when victims are allowed to 
speak (which is not always the case).19 The ICTY cases also involve 
complicated historical, forensic, and witness protection issues that re-
quire special expertise that needs to be developed by lawyers from all 
traditions.20 While the ICTY has developed a very helpful Manual for 
Practitioners and Practice Directions, this cannot substitute for a full 
inculcation into the norms and practice of the Tribunal.21
 The judicial skills are particularly complicated because the ICTY 
judges fall into three models: the judge-judge, the diplomat-judge, and 
                                                                                                                      
16 See generally Anne Beck & Sylvia Tonova, Note, No Legal Representation Without Gov-
ernmental “Interposition,” 17 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 597 (2004) (analyzing the U.S. executive 
order that governs ICTY defense counsel services provided by U.S. attorneys). 
17 See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 7, at 959. 
18 Id. at 957 (“Often the local Yugoslav attorneys who appear in front of the ICTY lack 
the skills necessary to undertake a massive international war crimes case.”). 
19 Hazan, supra note 5, at 187 (“Caught in their own logic as lawyers, they did not 
weigh the heaviness of the procedures created. The result: From appeal to appeal, the 
Tadic case lasts ªve years; that of General Blaskic, two years with periods of interruption 
that give the ICTY a sense of judicial self-absorption.”). 
20 Richard J. Wilson, Assigned Defense Counsel in Domestic and International War Crimes 
Tribunals: The Need for a Structural Approach, 2 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 145, 147 (2002) (“The 
law of war crimes itself is a rapidly developing blend of international and domestic con-
cepts and procedures, requiring unique skills, experience, knowledge, strategic sense and 
training on the part of defense counsel.”). 
21 Ellis, supra note 7, at 970 (“Though helpful and very solid, the Manual cannot sub-
stitute for trial advocacy experience.”). See also Practice Directions, http://www.un.org/ 
icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006). 
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the professor-judge.22 The judge-judge comes to the ICTY with sig-
niªcant experience trying cases in the judge’s home jurisdiction, 
whether in a civil law model, in which the judge would be signiªcantly 
more active, or in an adversarial model, in which the judge plays a 
more passive role. The diplomat-judge comes to the ICTY with a strong 
diplomatic background, but little or no experience managing a court-
room. The academic-judge typically comes to the ICTY with a rich and 
deep background in international human rights or criminal law, but 
often with little or no experience managing a courtroom. The early 
judicial pool was heavily populated with academic judges.23 Yet man-
agement skills are critical in running long and complicated trials, with 
defendants who may actively challenge the legitimacy of the Tribunal 
and evidentiary and other issues that require prompt rulings by the 
court.24
 Finally, infused throughout these structural and skill differences 
lies the underlying context of a war crimes tribunal. The ICTY is not a 
traditional court charged with trying cases that come before it. The 
ICTY is designed for “the prosecution” of those charged with perpetrat-
ing atrocities in the former Yugoslavia.25 While many of the atrocities 
were documented, the factual link between the crime and the perpetra-
tors is still in dispute.26 A series of not guilty verdicts would be a failure 
of the system, an acknowledgement that the ICTY could not make the 
link between the horrible crimes and the wrongdoers. While this natu-
ral tendency to push toward conviction exists in all criminal tribunals, it 
may be even stronger at the ICTY in the face of the signiªcant and hor-
rifying human rights abuses during the Balkan conºict. 
                                                                                                                      
22 Interview with ICTY judge, in The Hague, Netherlands (May 15, 2006) (summary 
on ªle with author). This interview was conducted as part of a long-term project interview-
ing judges to identify how judges address ethical issues within the courtroom. 
23 See Kerr, supra note 5, at 95. 
24 See Langer, supra note 5, at 886. Professor Langer explores “procedure as a device 
that the court uses with (even involuntary) collaboration and coordination from the par-
ties to process cases as swiftly as possible.” Id. at 878. This is related to but somewhat dis-
tinct from the skill set of controlling a trial under whatever model of judging is being used. 
Id. at 883–84. Cf. Penny J. White, Judicial Independence: Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Inde-
pendence by Use of Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 Fordham Urban L.J. 1053, 1072–73 
(2002) (describing methods to measure judicial management skills). 
25 S.C. Res. 808, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); see also M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 10 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 11, 42 (1997). 
26 The Milosevic trial demonstrated this dynamic. Establishing the crimes was relatively 
straightforward. The challenge was “to demonstrate that the chain of command leads to 
Milosevic.” Hazan, supra note 5, at 168. 
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 The ICTY is also not a typical post-hoc tribunal, but rather was cre-
ated by the U.N. Security Council, a political body, while the Balkan con-
ºict was still raging.27 The political context is an omnipresent concern.28 
The initial prosecution strategy to indict only second tier offenders, 
and not commanders and those who appeared to have orchestrated 
many atrocities, caused serious concern among the judges.29 Not sur-
prisingly, it was the continental law judges who most aggressively inter-
vened to challenge the prosecutor’s decision-making, rather than the 
common law judges, who traditionally take a more neutral role in the 
charging process.30 Eventually the common law judges joined in the 
criticism.31 This blending of roles once again demonstrates the com-
plexity of merging legal traditions with different actors having varying 
visions of their role. Meanwhile, diplomats who were attempting to ne-
gotiate a settlement were in communication with the Ofªce of the 
Prosecutor (OTP).32 They were sending signals that the interests in 
seeking justice (the goal of the ICTY) should not jeopardize the inter-
ests of a negotiated peace (the goal of the negotiators).33 Since the 
worst massacre, the deaths of 6000 to 9000 Muslims after the fall of 
Srebrenica in 1995, occurred during this period, it was apparent that 
the cautiousness of the ICTY did not beneªt the peace process. 
(Whether it would have prevented Srebrenica is another question be-
yond the scope of this Article.) The ICTY chief Prosecutor was pre-
sented with a “moral nightmare,” a challenge that could be the ªnal 
exam for a course on prosecutorial ethics.34
                                                                                                                      
27 Karine Lescure & Florence Trintignac, International Justice for Former 
Yugoslavia: The Working of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Hague 3 
(1996). 
28 Kerr, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that “the Tribunal must perform a delicate balanc-
ing act at the interface of law and politics, so that it is able to manipulate the political envi-
ronment in order to serve the judicial function, without the judicial process becoming 
politicized”). 
29 See Hazan, supra note 5, at 56–63. 
30 Id. at 58 (“The most active judges are nicknamed the Three Musketeers . . . all rep-
resenting continental law . . . .”). 
31 Id. at 59; see generally  Cassese, supra note 8. 
32 For example, while some diplomats were roundly condemning Slobodan Milosevic 
and Radovan Karadzic, other diplomats were actively negotiating with these same actors 
for peace. Meanwhile, the ICTY judges were urging more aggressive action against these 
commanders. Hazan, supra note 5, at 30–34, 61–63. 
33 Id. at 61–62. 
34 Id. at 63; see generally Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of Global Standard of Justice: Peace, 
Pluralism, and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 
801 (2006). 
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 What happens when you craft a new system in a high-stake inter-
national environment, bring in lawyers trained and inculcated into 
the norms of their own system, toss them in a salad bowl, and mix 
them up? A typical ICTY case would involve a three-judge panel that 
hears evidence and makes both ªndings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Each defendant typically has two defense counsel. The prosecu-
tor’s ofªce staffs cases with at least two prosecutors. Consequently, 
each case has a minimum of seven legal professionals and often many 
more, especially if multiple defendants are tried together. What hap-
pens in an individual case—think of it as a single salad plate—where 
the mix from the salad bowl might include judges and lawyers steeped 
in a civil law model, a blend of models, or a predominantly adversar-
ily-trained group? What happens when the judges come from one 
model, the lawyers from another? What happens if you have a panel 
with predominantly diplomat or academic judges, who lack experi-
ence in managing a courtroom? How do you bring disparate systems 
closer together on the ground? Of course, you will create procedural 
rules that address some of the speciªc bottom-line obligations to the 
court (when do you have to inform the other side of your witnesses, 
rights to cross examination, etc.), but there are a host of unanswered 
questions even when you spell out a procedure. 
 To help frame the inquiry, this Article looks at the multiple ways 
that attorney-conduct norms are created in the United States— sociali-
zation, malpractice, market controls, regulatory processes, and proce-
dural rules—and compares them to what appears to be the legal prac-
tice community emerging in the ICTY.35 With socialization as a weak 
harmonizing force, malpractice a non-existent factor, and market con-
trols of little effect, the more likely places for norm setting at the ICTY 
is through regulatory processes (Rules of Conduct) and procedural 
rules. Both of these methods lead directly to the judges as the domi-
nant source of norm setting within the ICTY. By necessity, the ICTY 
judges have taken a more active role than their U.S. counterparts have 
in creating norms of conduct. The experience at the ICTY suggests that 
future international courts would beneªt from more direct interaction 
                                                                                                                      
35 This Article uses the idea of professional norms to include statements of conduct 
that have the force of law (such as procedural rules), self regulation rules that have quasi-
legal force (such as rules of professional conduct that subject the lawyer to professional 
sanction if violated), and norms or claims of right behavior that may not be imposed by 
law, but shape our decision-making. In other words, this article will discuss both the law 
that directs and prohibits lawyer behavior and the values that help shape our discretionary 
choices. 
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between the judicial, prosecutorial, and defense functions as norms are 
created.36
I. Creation of Attorney Conduct Norms 
A. Social Norms 
 Abraham Lincoln “read” for the law, reading and learning by his 
own wits, and picking up some insights from more knowledgeable law-
yers who passed on the skills and culture of the legal profession.37 That 
quaint world has been supplanted by formal legal education, where 
social norms are transmitted from the beginning of law school.38 Most 
students come into U.S. law schools infused with a pop culture under-
standing of our adversary system shaped by years of television and news 
exposure. Students develop a more sophisticated perspective as they 
proceed through law school. Classroom methodology reinforces the 
role-based approach that dominates the adversary system. This sociali-
zation process continues as students move into temporary practice set-
tings as law clerks and interns, observing and picking up the social 
cues. Through conversations with friends who are practicing in a variety 
of areas, students begin to construct an understanding of the dynamics 
of practice and social norms. U.S. law students eventually become 
steeped in the adversarial model, with a healthy understanding (we 
hope) of its strengths and weaknesses. Through acculturation, law stu-
dents slowly learn “best practice” in a variety of settings. This is an in-
complete process and rightly criticized for failing to do a better job, but 
the shared educational experiences creates foundation expectations.39 
After law school, newly minted lawyers move into practice settings that 
will hopefully continue to inculcate best practices, whether in the role 
                                                                                                                      
36 In proceeding, I write from the perspective of an American law professor with a 
strong understanding of U.S. litigation ethics, but without a deep background in interna-
tional tribunals. This Article has beneªted greatly from the emerging and extremely help-
ful commentaries of practitioners before the ICTY and the many people who agreed to 
speak with me during my visit to the ICTY. 
37 Frederick Trevor Hill, Lincoln The Lawyer 27–34, 50–51, 70–81 (Fred B. 
Rothman & Co. 1986) (1906). 
38 Since the 1970s, the ªeld has heard critiques that law school is a dominant actor in 
the socialization of lawyers. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of 
Hierarchy, 32 J. Legal Educ. 591, 591–615 (1982). 
39 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Future of the Legal Profession: Institutionalizing Ethics, 
44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 665, 732–35 (1994); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction 
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 38–41 (1992). 
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of prosecutor, defense counsel, or state attorney general. Social norms 
are a small but important part of creating expectations of behavior. 
 Compare this acculturation process to the ICTY, which has twenty-
ªve judges from twenty-three different countries.40 The defense bar of 
the ICTY has 257 members, drawn from multiple legal traditions, with 
roughly half of the defense bar from the former Yugoslavia, which has a 
civil law tradition.41 Prosecutors come from variety of jurisdictions, al-
though their background and experience are not readily ascertainable 
from the public record. While all ICTY lawyers have access to the pro-
cedural rules, they bring quite divergent socialization experiences. 
However ºawed we believe our U.S. adversarial system to be, actors 
have some basic understanding of the role they should play, even if they 
have different views of how to execute that role. 
 In the ICTY, all of the norms were created from scratch. Civil and 
common law lawyers had to understand this new hybrid trial model 
and their role within that model. Judges were faced with challenging 
questions, ones that U.S. judges face and continue to struggle with, 
but often without the background or experience in how to address 
the issues. For example, what should judges, prosecutors, or defense 
counsel do when it appears that one lawyer is of questionable compe-
tence? When and to what degree should a judge intervene? How 
should a lawyer proceed when representing an uncooperative defen-
dant?42 When is a conºict of interest present? What norms should a 
judge refer to when assessing these questions?43 One can imagine that 
some of the earliest judges and lawyers felt like deer caught in the 
headlights, frozen with uncertainty about how to proceed. There was 
no shared history, background, or culture to help determine the best 
course of action. 
                                                                                                                      
40 Twelfth Annual Report, supra note 2, at 3. 
41 See Association of Defence Counsel Practicing Before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Members List, http://www.adcicty.org (last visited Oct. 
1, 2006). The composition of the defense bar has changed somewhat over time. As of 
1999, sixty-six percent of the defense bar came from the former Yugoslavia. Michael Boh-
lander, International Criminal Defence Ethics: The Law of Professional Conduct for Defence Counsel 
Appearing Before International Criminal Tribunals, 1 San. Diego Int’l L.J. 75, 78 (2000). 
42 This issue was particularly challenging in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, who main-
tained a strategy “not of disruption, but of perversion” by using the court’s own rules to 
serve as a bully pulpit to put forth his view of history. Hazan, supra note 5, at 161. 
43 This challenge of what norms or rules should govern attorney conduct has an inter-
esting parallel in the United States, where judges in federal courts generally, but not al-
ways, rely on the rules of conduct of the state in which the court sits. See Judith A. McMor-
row, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. 
Rev. 3, 6 (2005). 
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 Even as norms slowly emerged, as discussed below, there was a 
steady turnover of judges and counsel. At any one time there are four-
teen permanent judges, who are elected by the U.N. General Assembly 
for a four-year term and eligible for re-election.44 The judge pool can 
also include up to nine ad litem judges drawn from a pool of judges 
elected by the General Assembly.45 They may serve for only a single 
four-year term. This system assures that at least one-third of the judges 
turn over every four years. There is no systematic requirement for 
turnover of prosecutors or defense counsel, but there appears to have 
been a regular movement of lawyers in and out of those roles. For ex-
ample, four individuals have served as the chief prosecutor.46 The pool 
of defense counsel has also turned over.47 Each time there are new 
prosecutors, defense counsel, or judges, self-education begins anew. 
Because of both the disparate legal cultures and turnover, socialization 
through shared norms could not act as a strong harmonizing force at 
the ICTY. 
 Shared educational experience has more subtle effects. In the 
United States, the prosecution and defense counsel may have gone to 
the same school and had the same professors. Even if they did not 
share that common bond, they still had similar educational experi-
ences. In addition, they might live in the same community, vote in the 
same political election, and be exposed to the same pop culture. They 
often belong to the same bar association or Inns of Court, which pro-
vides opportunities to interact outside the courtroom. If they talk out-
side of the ofªce, they can sometimes build bonds of connection so 
that they do not see the opposing counsel as just a “hack,” the usual 
disparaging caricature for defense counsel, or “zealot,” the usual dis-
paraging caricature of a prosecutor.48
                                                                                                                      
 
44 Int’l Criminal Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola-
tions of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 
1991, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 13 bis (2006), 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/statute-feb06-e.pdf. 
45 Id. at 13 ter. 
46 ICTY Registry, ICTY 1994–2004: A Unique Decade 49 (2004). The ICTY summary 
of the ªrst ten years did not provide a summary of defense counsel. 
47 See Martha Walsh, The International Bar Association Proposal for a Code of Professional 
Conduct for Counsel Before the ICC, 1 J. Int’l Crim Just. 490, 494 (2003) (noting of the ICTY 
that “appearances before the tribunal are more irregular compared with either national 
bars or indeed more established international tribunals, thus lessening ‘gentleman’s peer 
pressure’ to comply” with a Code of Conduct). 
48 The World Bank’s Legal and Judicial Diagnostic of the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via identiªed the value of conversation: 
150 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 30:139 
 Too much cozy interaction of the prosecution and defense some-
times raises a question of collusion—that the legal system is just a big 
club of insiders.49 This is a special danger in the war crimes tribunals, 
which require credibility in the world community if the decisions of the 
war crimes tribunals are to have long-term effect. The ICTY is creating 
important human rights law that will help shape international norms if 
the legal standard applied, and the factual ªndings on which it is based, are 
deemed credible.50 The ICTY decisions are further developing the juris-
prudence of crimes against humanity,51 law of genocide,52 command 
responsibility,53 and rape as a war crime.54 The ICTY already faces a 
high hurdle in maintaining credibility as it survives political pressures, 
diplomatic exigencies, increased demands for efªciency, conºicting 
goals, and ambivalent support.55 If the ICTY is seen as an insider’s club, 
then the legal determinations will have less credibility in the world 
community. Creating sharp separations among judges, prosecutors, and 
defense counsel helps assure that each unit functions independently 
and without collusion. Providing a mix of lawyers from a variety of legal 
traditions also prevents the appearance of capture from any one or two 
nationalities. The ICTY has the additional challenge of establishing 
credibility within the former Yugoslavia. This lack of credibility can ºow 
not just from perceived victor’s justice, but also from a perception (and, 
                                                                                                                      
An association of the entire legal profession, including lawyers in private 
practice, the government, the judiciary and the academia, should effectively 
promote the interests of the entire profession and improve legal culture 
through facilitating communication and cooperation among jurists, provid-
ing a forum for discussion of topical issues in legislation, legal practice and 
legal reform, and organizing educational and public information initiatives. 
World Bank Legal Report, supra note 7, at 54. 
49 See generally Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Conªdence Game: Organiza-
tional Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & Soc’y Rev. 15 (1967) (describing collusion between 
prosecutors and defense counsel). 
50 See McClelland, supra note 5, at 10. 
51 Guenael Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals 147 
(2005) (“The [ad hoc] Tribunals have had an immense inºuence on the law of crimes 
against humanity, turning a set of abstract concepts into a fully ºedged and well-deªned 
body of law.”). 
52 Id. at 199–202. 
53 See McClelland, supra note 5, at 5–10. 
54 See generally Richard P. Barrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role 
for Conspiracy Law in International Tribunals, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 30 (2003) (discussing the 
evolution of rape as a war crime). 
55 See Hazan, supra note 5; Patricia M. Wald, Recent Books on International Law, 99 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 720 (2005) (reviewing Pierre Hazan’s Justice in a Time of War (2004)). 
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even worse, the reality) that the Tribunal is directly or indirectly pro-
tecting State leadership from prosecution.56
 Too little interaction among prosecutors, defense, and judges, 
however, risks demonization of those playing a different role.57 The 
ICTY appears to be a system of relatively little professional interaction 
with prosecutors, defense, and judges outside of the courtroom. In 
addition to the cultural divides that might exist, there is no common 
bar association.58 Prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel must be 
ºuent in either English or French, with some leeway for defense coun-
sel.59 Particularly where defense counsel is primarily skilled in the lan-
guage of the accused, language barriers may impair the ability to 
communicate outside the courtroom. Yet in some ways, the ICTY work 
setting might unintentionally cause insufªcient respect for bounda-
ries between roles. Many of the lawyers at the ICTY are young expatri-
ates who are living in a relatively small community, which raises a con-
cern that information might not be as secure as one would wish.60
 The structure of the ICTY encourages the separation of roles, at 
least between prosecutor and defense counsel. The ICTY is organized 
as a three-legged stool with a Registrar who oversees the administra-
tion of the tribunal, judges, and prosecutors. Individuals who work in 
                                                                                                                      
56 The contempt judgment against Milan Vujin sets out accusations by a journalist that 
the Serbian legal profession was protecting state leadership at the expense of individual 
defendants at the ICTY. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgement on Allega-
tions of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, ¶¶ 111–112 ( Jan. 31, 2000). That 
two of the most prominent defendants, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, are still at 
large eleven years after the massacres at Sebrenica reinforces this perception that the 
world community is not truly committed to bringing perpetrators to justice. Yet another 
dimension is concern by Dutch authorities “about attempts by Bosnian, Croat, and Serb 
spies to inªltrate the tribunal.” Hazan, supra note 5, at 181. 
57 Dominic Raab, Legal Advisor to the British Embassy in The Hague, has argued that 
independent functioning also “has undermined the development of any coherent and 
collective responsibility within the ICTY.” In his critique he focuses on “the three organs of 
the Tribunal—the Chambers, Registry and [Ofªce of the Prosecutor].” This structural 
choice places the defense function as a subset of the Registry rather than as an independ-
ent and coequal concern. Raab, supra note 2, at 98. 
58 A natural tendency would be for those ICTY lawyers with a shared language (Eng-
lish, French, or Serbian, for example) to gravitate toward similar social settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests this is true. 
59 Int’l Criminal Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola-
tions of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 
1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 3 (Languages), ICTY Doc. IT/32/Rev. 39 (Sept. 
22, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm [hereinafter R. P. & 
EVID.]. 
60 Interview with ICTY prosecutor #4, in The Hague, Netherlands (May 15, 2006) 
(notes on ªle with author). 
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these three branches are all U.N. employees and work in the same 
building. This structure is vintage civil law model, in which you would 
expect close interaction between judges and prosecutors. Since the 
procedural rules are heavily adversarial, however, the ICTY has cre-
ated separation of the judge and prosecutor function within the 
building. 
 Defense counsel are separate and are not ofªcially recognized as 
part of the ICTY. As such, the ICTY annual report has no section dis-
cussing the defense function. Any defense issues are ªltered through 
the Registrar, who has primary responsibility for assuring a defense 
function. Because most defendants cannot afford lawyers, legal fees 
for indigent defendants—who make up ninety percent of all defen-
dants—are paid by the Registrar.61 Defense counsel are housed away 
from the main ICTY building and are provided small ofªces in the 
ICTY building to use during trial.62 Only in the last few years have de-
fense counsel had access to the ICTY cafeteria without requiring a se-
curity escort. These issues reºect the growing pains of a new tribunal. 
They also reinforce a social isolation of defense counsel. 
 The ICTY professionals do not appear to have systems of talking to 
each other concerning professional issues on neutral territory—no in-
ternational court bar association and no regular in-house conferences. 
The relentless pressure of high-stakes litigation appears to absorb the 
energy of all participants, keeping them in their respective roles during 
long workdays. There are conferences around the world about war 
crimes, but as one defense counsel stated, “[W]e don’t usually get in-
vited to the table.”63 You can understand how easily the defense func-
tion gets marginalized. The nobility in prosecuting a war criminal is 
evident. You have to believe fundamentally in the rule of law to see the 
nobility of giving vigorous defense to people charged with war crimes.64 
A passionate justiªcation of the defense function is beyond the scope of 
                                                                                                                      
61 R. P. & Evid., supra note 59, at 44, 45, 45(c). 
62 See Tolbert, supra note 3, at 976 (“[F]or those who have visited the ICTY, one can 
hardly fail to notice that in its very physical layout, with the Prosecutor and Court located 
‘cheek by jowl’ and defense counsel situated generally offsite, there is perhaps a metaphor 
where the defense ªts into the scheme of things.”). 
63 Telephone Interview with ICTY defense counsel #2 (Mar. 23, 2006) (interview on 
ªle with author). 
64 This challenge to representation is particularly difªcult for lawyers with a strong 
faith, political, social, or gender identity. For a fascinating analysis of the challenges of 
being a Jewish lawyer representing a Muslim defendant charged with terrorism, see Amy 
Porter, Representing the Reprehensible and Identity Conºicts in Legal Representation, 14 Temp. 
Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 143 (2004) (exploring the question of “why you”?). 
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this Article. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that history is replete 
with scapegoats—people who were assumed to be bad because they 
were too close to the bad actors or were socially undesirable.65 You 
need full processes that test the facts to make sure that we have not 
fallen into the same wrong. Without a credible and vigilant defense, 
there is a risk that war crimes tribunals become victor’s justice and a 
predominantly political rather than legal body. Indeed, eight defen-
dants have been acquitted at ICTY trials.66
 The disparate legal backgrounds of the legal actors at the ICTY 
and the need for strict separation of functions means that socializa-
tion—the creation of shared norms through common background and 
reinforced through social interactions—does not appear to be a strong 
source of norms at the ICTY. There are too many different actors from 
too many different legal cultures, and it is not clear how much they are 
talking across roles (i.e., defense talking to prosecutors, prosecutors to 
defense, etc.). 
B. The Market 
 In the United States, the market also serves as a source of norms 
for attorney conduct. Client selection gives preference to certain kinds 
of lawyering services or styles, although we can concede it is an imper-
fect market. In other words, lawyers who offer certain kinds of services 
and behave in certain ways will attract certain kinds of clients.67 Certain 
practices will thrive, others not. As with social norms, the market serves 
like a sheep dog, setting the outer boundaries for lawyering. 
 A market analysis of client choice obviously does not work as we 
consider prosecutorial ethics because the chief prosecutor hires 
prosecutors.68 While in theory the defense side could have market 
                                                                                                                      
65 Flaws in the adjudication process have made some of these cases legendary. See gen-
erally Haywood Patterson & Earl Conrad, Scottsboro Boy (1950). 
66 See ICTY at a Glance, supra note 1 (follow “Key Figures” hyperlink). 
67 See generally John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the 
American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the 
Twenty-First Century, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 83 (2000) (arguing for a multidisciplinary ap-
proach to legal services in the United States). Market theories do not necessarily lead to 
more ethical lawyering. Some have noted that lawyers who act in an ethical manner may be 
at a competitive disadvantage. See James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of 
Ethics, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2395, 2494 (2003). 
68 During the early years of the ICTY the Tribunal received very little ªnancial support 
from the United Nations for its work. To ªll the gap, for a two year period beginning in 
1994, the United States placed twenty-two high-level functionaries (analysts, specialists, and 
lawyers) at the disposal of the Tribunal. This group served as the core of the Ofªce of the 
Prosecutor. Hazan, supra note 5, at 52. 
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forces shaping attorney conduct, the ICTY defense practice is not an 
open market where client selection can trump. Over ninety percent of 
the defendants have appointed counsel, which generally limits their 
choice to counsel on an approved list.69 Qualiªcations to be placed 
on the list are relatively low. Counsel must be admitted to practice in 
any country (or have a position as a university professor), and be 
proªcient in English or French, the two ofªcial languages of the tri-
bunal.70 Language proªciency can be waived with approval of the 
court in the interests of justice.71 In addition, defendants can request 
lawyers from the list—so a certain market thrives—and those requests 
appear to be honored as long as a conºict is not present.72 The ICTY 
tribunal sits in The Hague, however, remote from the former Yugosla-
via and from centers with pools of highly trained advocates. Initial 
compensation for assigned counsel was too low to provide even subsis-
tence to defense counsel, but it has improved signiªcantly.73
 This small, closed market did give rise to a serious attorney con-
duct issues in the early days of the ICTY, when there were some in-
stances of fee sharing by lawyers and clients.74 Because defense fees 
are set based on a world market, legal fees paid to U.S. lawyers might 
be seen as fairly modest, while the same fees paid to a lawyer from a 
less afºuent country could be huge ªnancial beneªt to the defense 
lawyer. As a result, some clients requested a certain lawyer if the law-
yer agreed to kick back some of the legal fees, either through direct 
payment or by hiring a member of the defendant’s family to serve on 
                                                                                                                      
69 Ellis, supra note 7, at 972. 
70 R. P. & Evid., supra note 59, at 44 (Appointment, Qualiªcation and Duties of Coun-
sel). 
71 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Decision on Defence Requests 
for Assignment of Counsel (Mar. 10, 1998) (authorizing the Registrar to allow counsel of 
choice even though counsel does not speak the languages of the Tribunal, on condition 
that counsel seek co-counsel who speaks one of the working languages). 
72 Ellis, supra note 7, at 963. The minimum qualiªcations drew David Tolbert, former 
Chef de Cabinet to the President and Senior Legal Adviser to the Registrar at the ICTY, to 
state that, “in practice, the right to choose counsel has reigned supreme for all accused.” 
Tolbert, supra note 3, at 978. 
73 Ellis, supra note 7, at 951–54. 
74 The Secretary-General, Report of the Ofªce of Internal Oversight Services on the Investiga-
tion into Possible Fee-Splitting Arrangements Between Defence Counsel and Indigent Detainees at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia, ¶ 2, U.N.Doc A/55/759 (Feb. 1, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/ 
reports/a55_759.pdf [hereinafter Fee Splitting Report]. 
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the legal team.75 Fee splitting, and the perception of the practice, had 
a very negative effect on the credibility of the Tribunal when the ac-
cused ºourished ªnancially from the trial. In addition, fee splitting 
was identiªed as prolonging ICTY proceedings and encouraging bill 
padding.76 In the short term, the problem was addressed on a case-by-
case basis by judges, who penalized lawyers for submitting frivolous 
motions.77 In the long term, the issue was addressed by forbidding the 
practice in the Defense Counsel Code of Conduct, discussed below. In 
effect, this intervention served as a market correction. 
 As with U.S. tribunals, the ICTY has limited a defendant’s ability 
to change counsel once assigned.78 In particular, claims of breakdown 
in communication and lack of trust in counsel alone does not justify 
removal of counsel.79 While the ICTY has a clear interest in prevent-
ing manipulation of the process by defendants, this issue presents a 
challenge to all involved. Trust is a long-standing and legitimate as-
pect of the attorney-client relationship in the United States, and a 
breakdown in trust is of serious concern. This issue is particularly 
acute where the defendant denies the legitimacy of the Tribunal. For 
example, Slobodan Milosevic was initially allowed to represent him-
self.80 Due to Milosevic’s ill health, the Trial Chamber assigned coun-
sel, who had previously acted as amici curiae for Milosevic. When Mil-
osevic refused to cooperate with the assigned counsel, they moved to 
withdraw, but the Tribunal denied their motion. The President of the 
ICTY, who afªrmed the denial to withdraw, was rather curt in advising 
counsel: “Representing criminal defendants is not an easy task. As-
signed Counsel would do well to recognize that fact, to realize the 
breadth of activities that they can carry out . . . and continue making 
the best professional efforts on his behalf that are possible under the 
                                                                                                                      
75 Id. ¶¶ 16-44; see also Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Decision ( July 8, 
2002) (withdrawing legal aid to Zoran Zigic after investigation revealed that defendant had 
received substantial means by cash transfers from defense team). 
76 See Fee Splitting Report, supra note 74, ¶ 42. 
77 See id. ¶ 68. 
78 See Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on Independent Counsel 
for Vidoje Blagojevic’s Motion to Instruct the Registrar to Appoint New Lead and Co-
Counsel, ¶¶ 115–121 ( July 3, 2003) (denying accused’s request to force withdrawal of 
counsel). 
79 See id. ¶ 120. 
80 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, ¶ 11 (Nov. 1, 
2004) (holding “defendants have a presumptive right to represent themselves before the 
Tribunal”). 
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circumstances.”81 The accused’s preferences played no role and with-
out the ability to act upon preferences, there can be no market factor 
in regulating attorney conduct. 
C. Malpractice 
 In the United States, malpractice lawsuits are an additional source 
of norms as courts identify speciªc ªduciary obligations of attorneys. 
Malpractice is an omnipresent concern for solo practitioners and law-
yers who practice in large ªrms.82 For example, it only took a few mal-
practice suits arising from a lawyer serving the board of director of cli-
ents, or the fear of such suits, to cause many ªrms to forbid lawyers 
from being both lawyer for a corporation and serving on that corpora-
tion’s board of directors.83 Some malpractice insurers have also im-
posed “best practices” on the law ªrms they insure as part of a loss-
prevention program.84
 Malpractice, however, has never been a vibrant source of attorney 
conduct norms in criminal cases. Prosecutors in the United States are 
generally immune from suit.85 For most criminal defendants, malprac-
tice does not offer a meaningful source of norms.86 We would antici-
pate the same problems for ICTY defendants who had poor counsel. If 
it would be hard in the United States for a criminal defendant to bring 
and win a malpractice claim against his or her attorney, imagine some-
one accused of war crimes coming into court and complaining about 
inadequate representation. They would not make very sympathetic tort 
defendants. Jurisdiction and choice of law issues would be painfully 
complex. Not surprisingly, there does not appear to have been any 
malpractice claims brought against a defense counsel practicing before 
                                                                                                                      
81 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision Afªrming the Registrar’s De-
nial of Assigned Counsel’s Application to Withdraw, ¶ 13 (Feb. 7, 2005). 
82 Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: No Lawyer or Client Is Safe, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 3, 43 
(1995). 
83 See Susan P. Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties: Conºict of Interest in Legal Prac-
tice 236–39 (2002). 
84 See id. at 38 (describing Attorney’s Liability Assurance Society’s vigorous loss preven-
tion program). 
85 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–31 (1976). 
86 Criminal defendants seek reversals of convictions as their ªrst remedy. See Judith A. 
McMorrow & Daniel R. Coquillette, The Federal Law of Attorney Conduct, 
Moore’s Federal Practice § 813.01 (3d ed. 2006). Malpractice is a poor substitute if the 
conviction is not overturned. The ICTY limits a defendant’s ability to introduce new evi-
dence on appeal to circumstances in which the evidence could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of due diligence. R. P. & Evid., supra note 59, 115 (Additional Evi-
dence). 
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the ICTY.87 As in the United States, malpractice is a source of norms 
only in civil cases. 
D. Self Regulation—Codes of Conduct 
1. Overview 
 Codes of conduct for attorneys imposed as part of a licensing sys-
tem are another important source of norms. Jurisdictions have varying 
regulatory frameworks for lawyers. Foreign lawyers are often surprised 
to learn that the United States maintains a long-standing, decentralized 
state-based licensing of lawyers. U.S. lawyers must pass a state bar exam, 
demonstrate that they meet the requirements for the character and 
ªtness threshold, and be sworn into the bar. As a requirement to prac-
tice, the lawyer is required to abide by the Rules of Professional Con-
duct of the state in which the lawyer is admitted. Because over forty 
states base their Rules of Conduct on a Model version, there is strong 
commonality among the lawyer codes, with some subtle variations.88 
These rules of conduct have signiªcant force since failure to abide by 
them can cause the lawyer to lose his or her license to practice law. This 
is a powerful sanction, but as a practical matter is used only for rogue 
actors. Data on disbarment suggests that rates of suspension from prac-
tice and disbarment have increased somewhat in recent years, but still 
represents a very small percentage—far less than one percent—of li-
censed lawyers.89 Experience of other countries, including the bar dis-
                                                                                                                      
87 Telephone Interview with Gregor Guy-Smith, President, Ass’n of Def. Counsel of 
ICTY (ADC) (Mar. 23, 2006) (notes on ªle with author) (stating he was not aware of any 
malpractice suits). The ADC opposed a draft provision in the International Criminal 
Court’s proposed Code of Conduct that would require liability insurance. They noted: 
Finally, the obligation with regard to professional liability insurance is clearly 
misplaced in a Code of Conduct. In addition, as a practical matter, is has to 
be taken into consideration that professional liability insurance is extremely 
expensive in some States (e.g. in the United States), and in many other coun-
tries is impossible to obtain. Therefore such a provision would be an impedi-
ment to representation by people from many countries and be prohibitively 
expensive for many criminal practitioners. 
ADC, Report: “Draft Code of Conduct for Counsel Before the ICC” 7 (1994), avail-
able at http://www.adcicty.org/documents/icc-codeconduct.pdf. 
88 See Margaret C. Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Sum-
mary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 441, 442 (2002). 
89 See Patricia W. Hatamyar & Kevin M. Simmons, Are Women More Ethical Lawyers? An 
Empirical Study, 31 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 785, 800 (2004) (studying serious disciplinary actions 
in 2000, comparing 857,931 licensed attorneys in 1995 and ªnding 3493 orders of attorney 
discipline decided in calendar year 2000). 
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ciplinary process of the former Yugoslavia, is similar.90 Nevertheless, 
codes of conduct serve as a theoretical ºoor for lawyer conduct. 
 The ICTY requires that counsel be licensed in their home juris-
diction, but initially did not require their lawyers to conform to any 
additional codes of conduct. It took more than ten years for the ICTY 
to create an enforceable code of conduct.91
2. Defense Counsel 
 The ªrst movement toward a code of conduct for ICTY attorneys 
emerged on the defense side. The impetus for a code of conduct, and 
a body to enforce it, is fascinating. The Registrar initially created a 
Code of Conduct for defense counsel in 1997, with the assistance of 
an advisory panel. It initially functioned as largely precatory.92 In ad-
dition, the Code of Conduct was drafted by the judges,93 which meant 
that the Code drafting process itself did not become a strong source 
of norm creation. 
 It is not surprising that the Registrar took on the initial role of 
creating a code of conduct for defense counsel since the Registrar is 
impliedly authorized under the rules of procedure to ensure that only 
qualiªed practitioners appear before the court.94 Defense counsel 
have serious challenges to collective action at the ICTY. While prose-
cutors work full-time for the Tribunal, defense counsel are hired on a 
case-by-case basis, and many maintain a legal role in their home juris-
diction. Defense counsel may not have the time, travel ºexibility, or 
ªnancial resources to invest in improving the community of defense 
counsel when they are intensely involved, but often for only one or 
two cases. Certainly in the waning days of the ICTY, with its express 
                                                                                                                      
90 World Bank Legal Report, supra note 7, at 52 (describing regulatory framework, 
noting that “many attorneys believe the disciplinary system to be very weak”). 
91 It is interesting to note that the early efforts to create a code of conduct at the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) were criticized as “premature.” See Walsh, supra note 47, 
at 500. The ICC process had the beneªt of two modern criminal courts—the ICTY and the 
International Criminal Court for Rwanda—to draw upon. 
92 Tolbert, supra note 3, at 985. Rule 46(c) now establishes the authority of the regis-
trar: “Under the supervision of the President, the Registrar shall publish and oversee the 
implementation of a Code of Professional Conduct for Defence counsel.” R. P. & Evid., 
supra note 59, at 46(c); see also Walsh, supra note 47, at 492–96. 
93 Ellis, supra note 7, at 966–67. 
94 See Bohlander, supra note 41, at 82. 
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and controversial “completion strategy” underway, such a community 
of interest is unlikely to emerge.95
 In 2002, nine years into the work of the ICTY, the Association of 
Defense Counsel Practicing Before the ICTY was born.96 Most intrigu-
ing is the impetus for this organization. It was the judges who created 
this entity. As the Association of Defence Counsel-ICTY states: 
The Judges felt that there was a need to have an association 
which could ªrst ensure a higher quality for defense counsel 
and make collective representations to the organs of the Tri-
bunal on behalf of all Defence Counsel involved in cases. 
Moreover, it was necessary to have such an association in the 
context of the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Ap-
pearing Before the International Tribunal the Judges adopted 
and its associated Disciplinary mechanism. 
 The Judges adopted modiªcations to the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence, making membership of a recognized as-
sociation of counsel a necessary requirement to be put on the 
so-called Rule 45 List (list of qualiªed counsel). This re-
quirement can be found in Rule 44.97
This Association of Defense Counsel (ADC) was intended to facilitate 
collective action by defense and serve as a regulatory body to identify 
and expel rogue actors who failed to comply with the Code of Profes-
sional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the ICTY.98 The ADC 
has a disciplinary committee and a procedural apparatus to determine 
if a lawyer has violated the Code of Conduct. Like the U.S. experience, 
there have not been a ºood of cases. Since inception, three cases have 
been brought to the ADC disciplinary committee.99 The cases are con-
ªdential, so we do not know the facts, circumstances, or outcomes. 
Without public disclosure of the resolution, or at least disclosure 
                                                                                                                      
95 See generally Raab, supra note 2 (explaining and evaluating the ICTY completion 
strategy). 
96 See Association of Defence Counsel: Practicing Before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, http://www.adcicty.org (follow “History” hyperlink 
under “ADC-ICTY”) (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
97 Id. 
98 A similar model exists in the United States in states with an integrated bar, where 
the state “bar association” also serves as the licensing body for lawyers. Charles W. Wolf-
ram, Modern Legal Ethics 36–38 (1986). 
99 Email from Peter Murphy, Chair of Disciplinary Committee of ADC to Judith 
McMorrow, Professor of Law, Boston College Law School (Mar. 22, 2006 18:33 EST) (on 
ªle with author). 
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among the ICTY practitioners, the ªndings will not be a strong source 
of norms. 
 Because the Code of Conduct reinforces the counsel’s role, it is 
infused with the value judgments of the procedural system adopted by 
the ICTY, which is heavily adversarial. The Code of Conduct creates a 
client-centered relationship that requires the lawyer to counsel the cli-
ent and abide by the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the 
representation (unless they would otherwise violate the Code).100 The 
lawyer retains the power to determine the means by which the objec-
tives are pursued.101 The Code of Conduct contains express provisions 
on conªdentiality, conºict of interest, conduct before the Tribunal, re-
sponsibility of supervisory and subordinate counsel, and the like. The 
U.S. inºuence on the ICTY Code of Conduct is apparent, and not sur-
prising given the adversarial model that predominates at the ICTY.102
 We can garner some insights into the Defense Counsel’s view of 
the Code of Conduct by their comments to the International Criminal 
Court’s proposed Code of Conduct. The ADC embraces the concept 
of a statement of norms and appears to embrace the core content of 
the Code. At the margins, they disagree with speciªc issues, including 
the obligation to inform the Registrar if a client requests fee split-
ting.103 The obligation to the client’s interest above all still does not sit 
well for the ADC, suggesting an adversarial excess.104
 In the end, however, the ICTY has already confronted the prob-
lem that U.S. courts have discovered. A Code of Conduct often has 
general norms that require courts and context to bring them to life. 
Consider Article 27 on Obligations of Counsel to Others: 
                                                                                                                      
100 ICTY Code of Conduct, supra note 15, art. 8 (deªning the scope of representa-
tion). 
101 Id. 
102 See generally Bohlander, supra note 41 (explaining the U.S. inºuence on the ICTY 
Code of Conduct). 
103 ICTY Code of Conduct, supra note 15, art. 18 (when client requested, induced, or 
encouraged fee splitting “[Counsel] shall advise their clients on the prohibition of such 
practices and shall report the incident to the Registrar forthwith”). A similar provision of 
the ICC Code imposing an obligation to inform the Registrar is criticized as “absolutely 
inconsistent with Counsel’s duty to act loyal and to respect the conªdentiality of all infor-
mation that becomes known to him in the course of his professional activity.” Stefan 
Kirsch, Draft Code of Conduct for Counsel Before the ICC 12 (2004), http://www. 
adcicty.org/documents/icc-codeconduct.pdf. 
104 In criticizing the conºict of interest provision of the ICC draft code of conduct, the 
ADC commented that “[i]t is submitted that it might be excessive to require putting the 
client’s interests before counsel’s own interests or those of any other person, organization 
or State from Counsel.” Kirsch, supra note 103, at 13. 
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C. Counsel shall recognise the representatives of the parties 
as professional colleagues and shall act fairly, honestly and 
courteously towards them.105
What does this mean? It requires speciªc circumstances to be inter-
preted. The judges are the actors in the position to provide an inter-
pretation, or at a least a reminder to the counsel that these values are 
required.106
 The open-textured nature of the Code of Conduct is demon-
strated by a 2003 decision from the Trial Chamber on a motion to re-
place counsel. The ICTY Code contains an obligation to represent the 
client “diligently and promptly” and “keep a client informed about 
the status of a matter before the Tribunal.”107 The provision on Scope 
of the Representation states, among other requirements, that counsel 
shall (i) “abide by the client’s decision concerning the objectives of 
representation” and (ii) “consult with the client about the means by 
which those objectives are to be pursued, but is not bound by the cli-
ent’s decision.”108 Vidoje Blagojevic (the accused) initially became 
dissatisªed with the appointment of co-counsel and eventually sought 
removal of his chief counsel.109 The Registrar declined to remove 
counsel and provided a written justiªcation for the decision. The Trial 
Chamber then appointed an independent counsel to bring a motion 
to review the Registrar’s decision. The Trial Chamber’s opinion runs 
forty-two pages long and, in a detailed analysis unlikely to be seen 
from a U.S. courtroom, delves into the foundation of the right to 
counsel, including the relationship between the accused and his ap-
pointed counsel. The Trial Chamber evaluated whether counsel had 
met the obligations as required by the Code of Conduct. The Trial 
Chamber concluded that no act of misconduct or manifest negligence 
                                                                                                                      
105 ICTY Code of Conduct, supra note 15, art. 27. 
106 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Order Concerning Guidelines on 
Evidence and the Conduct of Parties During Trial Proceedings, part IV (Oct. 21, 2004). 
107 ICTY Code of Conduct, supra note 15, art. 11 (Diligence), art. 12 (Communica-
tion). 
108 Id. art. 8. 
109 This decision leaves a lurking concern about what role the gender of the co-counsel 
played, since the accused complained that co-counsel was not a “strong person.” Prosecu-
tor v. Blagojevic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on Independent Counsel for Vidoje Blago-
jevic’s Motion to Instruct the Registrar to Appoint New Lead and Co-Counsel, ¶ 36 ( July 3, 
2003). The Accused also sought to have a third person assigned as counsel, but lead coun-
sel interviewed that third person and found that he lacked the necessary qualiªcations. Id. 
¶ 84. 
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had occurred.110 Additionally, the Trial Chamber concluded that a 
client’s decision “to cease communication with counsel is not equiva-
lent to counsel breaching their obligation to communicate and con-
sult with their client.”111 The Trial Chamber also recognized that de-
fense counsel “have an ethical obligation to promote trust and to 
build trust.”112 Rather than remove counsel, whom the Court con-
cluded had not acted improperly, the Court appointed a legal repre-
sentative for a ªxed period to help improve relations between the ac-
cused and counsel.113 The Court was breathing life and context into 
the Code of Conduct. 
 Not just the interpretation but also the content of the Code of 
Conduct ultimately rests in part on the judges. Initially drafted under 
the auspices of the Registrar, Article 6 of the Code of Conduct states, 
“[u]nder the supervision of the President, amendments shall be 
promulgated by the Registrar after consultation with the permanent 
Judges, the Association of Counsel and the Advisory Panel.”114 This 
provision assures that the judges continue to play a central role in de-
ªning proper attorney conduct. 
3. Prosecutors 
 The OTP issued Standards of Professional Conduct for Prosecu-
tion in 1999,115 under the leadership of Louise Arbour, then the Chief 
Prosecutor of the ICTY. The standards consist of a three page docu-
ment, with ªfteen statements, such as a duty to: “serve and protect the 
public interest;” “be consistent, objective and independent, and avoid 
all conºicts of interest;” “demonstrate respect and candor before the 
Tribunal;” “assist the Tribunal to arrive at the truth and to do justice 
for the international community, victims and the accused;” “preserve 
professional conªdentiality;” and “avoid communication with a Judge 
. . . about the merits of a particular case, except within the proper 
context of the proceedings in the case.”116 This document has been 
                                                                                                                      
110 Id. ¶ 120. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. ¶ 121. 
113 Id. ¶ 114, Disposition ¶¶ 1–3. 
114 ICTY Code of Conduct, supra note 15, art. 6 (Amendment). 
115 Prosecutor’s Regulation No. 2 (1999), Standards of Professional Conduct for Prosecu-
tion Counsel, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/prosecutor/pros_2.doc. 
At the time this Regulation was issued the Ofªce of the Prosecutor directed prosecutions 
both at the ICTY and for the Rwanda Tribunal. 
116 Id. ¶ 2. 
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noted a few times in ICTY opinions, to serve as a frame of reference 
or to reinforce what would constitute good practices.117 For example, 
the Standards have been cited to suggest that the prosecution could 
use its own resources and persuasive power to facilitate an interview 
between defense counsel and a prospective uncooperative witness.118 
Unlike the Code of Conduct for Defence Counsel, however, it is not 
an ofªcially embraced document of the ICTY. 
 The OTP is a powerful body whose actions reºect a vision of pro-
fessional conduct. There appears to be little public discussion about a 
need for a more developed and publicly distributed prosecutorial code 
of conduct. The individual prosecutors are part of a unit—a bureau-
cratic structure that implements a more detailed screening of assistant 
prosecutors, periodic review, and term contracts—which perhaps pro-
vides more internal sanctioning and control of errant behavior than is 
available for defense counsel.119 This is difªcult to assess, however, be-
cause the internal functioning of the OTP is not transparent. 
 From my discussions with prosecutors, there is every indication 
that prosecutors care deeply about professional responsibility and dis-
cuss issues internally as they arise. The challenge for prosecutors, as 
with defense counsel, is that many structural choices have ethical con-
sequences. Some prosecutorial issues overlap with political issues: what 
priority to give to prosecutions, indicting lower-level actors ªrst as an 
effort to squeeze higher-level actors, individual charging decisions 
(such as charging only those items that are most likely to be proved), 
and plea bargaining and all its cultural and adversarial notions. The 
chief prosecutor of an international tribunal holds a very powerful po-
                                                                                                                      
117 Section one addresses the considerations used by the prosecutor in setting out the 
regulation. The important substantive comments include a statement that prosecutors 
“represent the international community” and that the standards “should promote princi-
ples of fairness and professionalism.” Id. In addition, the considerations state that “the 
duties and responsibilities of the Prosecutor differ from, and are broader than, those of 
defense counsel.” Id. 
118 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Decision on Application for Subpoenas, 
¶ 13, n.19 ( July 1, 2003); see also Prosecutor v. Hadzihasonovic, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Deci-
sion on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Review of the Decision of the Registrar to Assign Mr. 
Rodney Dixon as Co-Counsel to the Accused Kubura (Mar. 24, 2002) (examining the 
Standards and refraining from answering the conºict issue presented to the court); Prose-
cutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Decision on Motions to Extend Time 
for Filing Appellant’s Briefs (May 11, 2001) (citing Prosecutor’s Regulation No. 2 in de-
scribing prosecutor’s duty to assist in the administration of justice). 
119 Interview with prosecutor #3, in The Hague, Netherlands (May 15, 2006) (notes on 
ªle with author). 
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sition with comparatively little oversight.120 These decisions have not 
been immune from public criticism by commentators.121
 Even excluding issues that overlap directly with the political and 
legal goals of the Tribunal, there are still legitimate ambiguities that 
need to be addressed when merging legal cultures. As noted above, 
prosecutors should be concerned about how and when they can com-
municate with judges, issues of conªdentiality, providing timely discov-
ery, conduct during plea bargaining, trial conduct, and conºicts of in-
terest (particularly when shifting roles from prosecutor to defense 
counsel).122 For example, in 2001 the Registrar allowed a former prose-
cutor to join a defense team, even though the lawyer “during his as-
signment with the Ofªce of the Prosecutor . . . had provided advice, 
drafted documents on legal issues and assisted with two cases against 
accused relating to the central Bosnia region.”123 The Registrar placed 
the burden on the OTP to come forward with evidence of a conºict. 
The former prosecutor agreed to “respect the conªdentiality of any 
information to which he had had access whilst working with the Ofªce 
of the Prosecutor . . . .”124 While the Registrar and the lawyers involved 
agreed that the representation could not proceed if a conºict was pre-
sent, that term was never deªned. Under a U.S. understanding of con-
ºict, the prosecutor would be prohibited from representing a defen-
dant when the prosecutor had worked personally and substantially on 
the matter, unless the government agency involved gave its informed 
consent in writing.125 We do not have sufªcient information from the 
public record to fully critique this decision. Certainly, the Registrar 
would have beneªted from more detailed criteria on what constitutes 
an impermissible conºict of interest when a prosecutor moves to the 
defense function. 
                                                                                                                      
120 See Allison Marston Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and the Independent Counsel, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1633, 1651 (2003) (argu-
ing that the broad prosecutorial discretion of the U.S. independent counsel scheme is not 
a good foundation to reºexively object to the ICC); see also Danner, infra note 127. 
121 See Hazan, supra note 5; Timothy Williams Waters, Unexploded Bomb: Voice, Silence, 
and Consequence at the Hague Tribunals; A Legal and Rhetorical Critique, 35 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & 
Pol. 1015, 1018 (2003). 
122 See generally R. Michael Cassidy, Prosecutorial Ethics (2005). 
123 Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Alagic and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decisions 
of Nov. 26 and Dec. 19, 2001 (Supp. 29–Nov./Dec. 2001), available at http://www.un.org/ 
icty/Supplement/Supp29-e/hadzihasanovic.htm. 
124 Id. 
125 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct § 1.11(a)(2) (2002). 
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 The OTP is in the process of crafting a new code to set expecta-
tions about behavior.126 This process, however, is currently entirely an 
internal process. The prosecutor’s role is not crafted in isolation, 
however, but beneªts from informed discussion. For example, sig-
niªcant policy issues arise from switching sides, and all those inter-
ested in a well-functioning Tribunal should at least have an opportu-
nity to comment on these policy choices. The defense function can be 
enriched by employing individuals who understand the prosecutorial 
process, yet the prosecutor has a keen interest in assuring the integrity 
and conªdentiality of its internal deliberations. Greater transparency 
and more input in rule development would itself aide the dialogue 
about roles.127
4. Judges 
 While much has been written about the Code of Conduct for de-
fense counsel at both the ICTY and the emerging International 
Criminal Court, very little has been written on the need for a code of 
judicial conduct. Judges would also beneªt from written norms that 
clarify their role. As with both defense and prosecutor codes of con-
duct, this is no panacea, but a written code of judicial conduct would 
give new judges a common ground for discussion. It would help clar-
ify what constitutes judicial independence128 and serve as a check on 
abuses and mistakes.129 A publicly developed document would allow 
both the prosecutors and defense to see more vividly how the roles of 
each of the three key units—prosecution, defense, and judges—are 
deªned. The need is more acute because the actors are coming from 
a variety of legal cultures. With a completion strategy underway, it is 
probably too late for the ICTY to develop a code of judicial conduct, 
but the next tribunals may beneªt from the simultaneous develop-
ment of defense, prosecution, and judicial codes. 
                                                                                                                      
126 Interview with prosecutor #4, in The Hague, Netherlands (May 15, 2006) (notes on 
ªle with author). 
127 Cf. Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial 
Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 510, 511 (2003) (suggesting 
that “for the Prosecutor, good process should include the public articulation of prosecuto-
rial guidelines that will shape and constrain his discretionary decisions”). 
128 Cf. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 
Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2005) (arguing against judicial independence in international tribunals). 
129 Theodor Meron, Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribu-
nals, 99 Am. J.Int’l L. 359, 361 (2005). 
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E. Rules of Procedure and Inherent Powers 
1. Overview 
 The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, crafted and modiªed 
by the Tribunal judges, have several provisions that provide express or 
implied power to address attorney conduct issues. This is part of what 
Judge Patricia Wald identiªes as the “soft law” of the Tribunal.130 Some 
rules establish the Registrar and judge’s control over entry into the 
ICTY defense function. Yet other rules deal with courtroom behavior, 
including the speciªc power to address obstructive behavior and con-
tempt of court. A catchall concept of “inherent powers” also serves as a 
basis for addressing attorney conduct issues. Each of these powers is 
addressed below. They all have in common the dominant power of the 
judges to shape, directly or indirectly, the contours of attorney conduct. 
2. Control over Entry 
 The judges and the Registrar hold the power of entry. Rule 44 
governs the appointment, qualiªcations, and duties of defense coun-
sel.131 Under Rule 44, the baseline requirements are minimal. Lawyers 
who appear before the ICTY must be licensed to practice in a state or 
be a university professor of law, have written and oral proªciency in 
English or French (or obtain a waiver), be a member in good stand-
ing of the ADC, have no disciplinary ªndings or criminal convictions, 
and not have provided false or misleading information in relation to 
his or her qualiªcations and ªtness to practice.132 In addition, there is 
a catch-all provision stating that counsel “has not engaged in conduct 
. . . which is dishonest or otherwise discreditable to a counsel, preju-
dicial to the administration of justice, or likely to diminish public con-
ªdence in the International Tribunal . . . .”133 This latter provision was 
one of several of the qualiªcations that was added in 2004.134 These 
requirements allow the Registrar to exclude counsel with a history of 
misconduct. Even without express rules, the ICTY has also interpreted 
                                                                                                                      
130 Patricia M. Wald, Tribunal Discourse and Intercourse: How the International Courts Speak 
to One Another, 30 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 15, 20–26 (2007). 
131 R. P. & Evid., supra note 59, at 44(A) (“a counsel shall be considered qualiªed to 
represent a suspect or accused if the counsel satisªes the Registrar that he or she . . . .”). 
132 Id. at 44(A)(i)-(v), (vii). 
133 Id. at 44(vi). 
134 See IT/231, Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Aug. 5, 2004, 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm. 
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its inherent power to allow the Court to deny audience to an attorney 
who engages in signiªcant misconduct.135 ICTY judges also have the 
ability under Rule 46 to “refuse audience to counsel for acting in an 
offensive, abusive, or otherwise obstructive manner.”136 Rule 46 pro-
vides an independent basis to deny counsel the right to practice. 
 Once an attorney has met the minimum standards to be eligible to 
practice before the ICTY, actually being assigned to an indigent defen-
dant is a separate step.137 The ten percent of defendants who have 
means to pay for their own counsel do so. The remaining ninety per-
cent of defendants are appointed counsel from an approved list. To be 
eligible for assignment, the lawyer must demonstrate additional 
qualiªcations, including competence in criminal law, international 
humanitarian law, or international human rights law, possess at least 
seven years of relevant experience, and be readily available for assign-
ment.138
 As noted above, the defendant’s requests for appointment of 
counsel are typically honored, but once appointed the defendant will 
have less inºuence. Just as in the United States, barriers to entry do not 
attempt to harmonize values; entry requirements set a ºoor of behav-
ior. 
3. Contempt (Rule 77) and Inherent Powers 
 ICTY judges have express contempt power under Rule 77 and 
have used it against attorneys. Rule 77 contempt power is penal in na-
ture and requires a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof.139 
Consequently, it is used only for the most egregious misconduct of 
“knowingly and wilfully interfering with the administration of jus-
tice.”140 The jurisprudence of contempt initially appears to be code-
based. In its application to attorneys, however, the Tribunal has read 
this statutory contempt power through the lens of its inherent power 
                                                                                                                      
135 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, Decision on the Request of 
the Accused Radomir Kovac to Allow Mr. Milan Vujin to Appear as Co-Counsel Acting Pro 
Bono, ¶ 13 (Mar. 14, 2000). 
136 See R. P. & Evid., supra note 59, at 46; see also Bohlander, supra note 41, at 83. 
137 See generally International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Directive on 
Assignment of Defence Counsel, IT-073-REV11-e, Aug. 4, 2004, available at http://www.un. 
org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/counsel/IT073-rev11-e.htm. 
138 Id. art. 14. 
139 Tribunal Statute, art. 15, cited in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Ap-
peal Judgment on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, ¶¶ 16, 22 
(Feb. 27, 2001); R.P. & Evid., supra note 59, at 77(E) & 87(A). 
140 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Judgment, ¶ 5 (Feb. 27, 2001). 
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to control the proceedings before it. As such, the emerging doctrine 
is judge-made and ºuid. 
 The idea of the inherent power of the court is a well established 
doctrine in the United States, where the court’s inherent power is 
signiªcant, although not unlimited.141 In the United States, the in-
herent power doctrine has been used to sanction attorneys for con-
duct even when there is a speciªc rule in place that addresses the 
same conduct.142 The ICTY has also recognized the inherent power 
necessary to assure the proper administration of justice. This power 
exists even in the absence of a procedural rule addressing this power, 
a conclusion that is startling to lawyers from a civil law tradition.143 It 
also appears that the ICTY is developing a strong doctrine of inherent 
powers similar to the doctrine as it has emerged in the United States. 
 Contempt proceedings have been initiated against three attor-
neys at the ICTY. In its seminal case on contempt, Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
the Court created the framework for its contempt jurisdiction, while 
at the same time it sent a strong message that attorney misbehavior 
will be addressed. Vujin was accused of manipulating witnesses, put-
ting forth evidence known to be false, as well as bribing witnesses. He 
was co-counsel for Dusko Tadic, the ªrst defendant to appear before 
the Tribunal. Consequently, the underlying trial was a test of legiti-
macy for the Tribunal itself. The Court needed to clarify norms of 
conduct promptly. The Tribunal found attorney Milan Vujin’s con-
duct to be so egregious that it recommended the Registrar strike his 
name from the list of assigned counsel in accordance with Rule 45 of 
the Tribunals Rules of Procedure and Evidence, along with a further 
recommendation that his misconduct be reported to his national bar 
association. The Court expressly relied on a desire to both punish Vu-
jin and deter other attorneys from similar conduct.144
 The other two cases of contempt against attorneys were more fac-
tually ambiguous situations. In Prosecutor v. Simic, Simic, Tadic, Todorovic, 
                                                                                                                      
141 See The Federal Law of Attorney Conduct, supra note 86, ch. 807 (The Inher-
ent Power of Federal Courts to Regulate the Conduct of Attorneys); see generally Fred A. 
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of 
a Theory, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1303 (2003) (describing the power of the courts to regulate 
attorneys). 
142 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991). 
143 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt 
Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, ¶ 28 ( Jan. 31, 2000). 
144 Id. ¶ 168 (“The contempt requires punishment which serves not only as retribution 
for what has been done but also as deterrence of others who may be tempted to do the 
same.”). 
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& Zaric, the Court conducted an extensive hearing to determine 
whether defendant Milan Simic and his counsel, Branislav Avramovic, 
had knowingly and willfully interfered with the administration of justice 
(i.e., committed contempt) by threatening and bribing a witness.145 
Witness intimidation is an ongoing and serious concern at the ICTY. 
The Court took evidence and ultimately concluded that the uncor-
roborated evidence of a witness, who ultimately was found to lack the 
necessary credibility, did not support proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.146
 In Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, defense counsel Anto Nobilo was found 
in contempt and ªned for having revealed the identity of a protected 
witness.147 The Appeals Chamber ultimately overturned that ªnding 
on the grounds that Mr. Nobilo did not have actual knowledge that 
there was a witness protection order applicable to the witness and did 
not act with willful blindness to the fact that the witness was pro-
tected.148 While clarifying the legal requirements for knowing viola-
tion of a court order, two other dimensions of the Aleksovski opinion 
are worthy of comment. First, a concurring opinion by Judge Patrick 
Robinson gave advice to the prosecutor, stating that “unless there is 
evidence of mala ªdes, counsel should be given the beneªt of the 
doubt, and the prosecutorial discretion should be exercised in his fa-
vour” and stating that contempt proceedings should not have been 
brought. Whether the prosecutor gave weight to that view is not 
known. The Appeals Chamber’s main opinion is also interesting for 
what it did not address. The Court did not delve into the underlying 
structural pressures that made such errors more likely to occur. Mr. 
Nobilo testiªed that “because of the prosecution’s practice of reveal-
ing the identity of its witnesses only forty-eight hours in advance, he 
was obliged to research everyone who might be a witness, and that he 
relied upon a number of sources for that information.”149 Inadequate 
                                                                                                                      
145 Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-R77, Judgement in the Matter of Contempt Al-
legations Against An Accused and His Counsel ( June 30, 2000). 
146 Id. ¶¶ 91–100. 
147 Le Procureur c/ Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1 (Dec. 11, 1998). The Trial Cham-
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Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt (May 30, 2001). See generally Fatema E. Fallahenejad 
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time to prepare for and obtain full information on witnesses is cer-
tainly a contributing factor to errors such as inadvertent disclosure of 
a witness’ identity.150
4. Response to Courtroom Activity 
 The ICTY judges also have the full range of power to consider 
counsel’s conduct at every stage of a proceeding and can communi-
cate their concerns by direct order or gentle reminder. While ªnding 
that attorney Vujin’s payments to a witness were not intended as a 
bribe, the Court gave advice to future counsel that “it is unwise for any 
lawyer to give gifts to a prospective witness, for whatever reason, be-
cause such a gift can so easily be misinterpreted—either by the witness 
or by others.”151 The Tribunal has also suggested that fees be withheld 
for frivolous motions.152 Like their U.S. counterparts, the ICTY judges 
have a distaste for broad accusations of misconduct by opposing 
counsel. They do not like ethics wars. As a result, lawyers have been 
admonished for making frivolous claims of prosecutorial miscon-
duct153 and have been urged to have open communication and ascer-
tain the facts before making claims of professional misconduct.154 The 
ICTY judges also must consider whether claims of misconduct are 
made for strategic advantage.155
 Through these court pronouncements, judges indicate what con-
stitutes appropriate or inappropriate behavior. But the ICTY judges 
have relatively little guidance on how to reªne attorney conduct 
norms beyond inferences from the rules of procedure and whatever 
guidance is available from codes of conduct. Even within the U.S. ad-
versarial system, judges have different levels of tolerance for adversar-
                                                                                                                      
150 Later procedural changes now require prosecutors to provide a list of witnesses six 
weeks prior to the pre-trial conference. R.P. & Evid., supra note 59, at 65 ter (E). 
151 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt 
Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, ¶¶ 157(a), 158 ( Jan. 31, 2000). 
152 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Decision on Motions by Zoran Kupre-
skic, et al., for Leave to Appeal the Decision of the Appeals Chamber dated 29 May 2001 
( June 18, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/Supplement/supp25-e/kupreskic.htm 
(“The Registrar is requested to consider withholding payment of any fees or costs involved in 
the preparation of manifestly ill-founded and frivolous Motions which constitute an abuse of 
the court process.”). 
153 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on Motion to Seek 
Leave to Respond to the Prosecution’s Final Brief, ¶ 16 (Sept. 28, 2004). 
154 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, and Landzo, Order Disposing of Defence Mo-
tion Pursuant to Rule 46 and for Disclosure of Document (Oct. 8, 1997), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/order-e/71008de2.htm. 
155 See, e.g., Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, ¶¶ 117–118. 
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ial behavior of lawyers. Only through both case-by-case experience in 
litigation and conversation in professional settings outside the court-
room can a shared understanding of good practice be developed. 
II. The Judges as Norm Setters 
 When analyzing how norms of attorney conduct are established 
in international tribunals, all roads lead back to the judges.156 As with 
U.S. courts, the judges at the ICTY have been the dominant source of 
creating norms of attorney conduct at the tribunal. Judges ultimately 
control the Code of Conduct for defense counsel. Indeed, they will 
likely control any Code of Judicial Conduct that might be created. 
While they do not control any incipient code of conduct for prosecu-
tors, they also have no obligation to give deference to a solely internal 
document from the OTP. Judges control the procedures, which shape 
the institutional pressures that push lawyer conduct in certain direc-
tions. This inherent power allows the judges to ªll in the blanks left in 
attorney conduct issues. In addition, judges signal lawyers through 
their rulings on motions and other interactions within the courtroom. 
 From the U.S. experience, this is obvious and almost inevitable. 
Despite the U.S. regime of fairly well-developed state schemes of regu-
lation, litigation ethics has been overwhelming shaped by what judges 
will accept in their courtrooms. U.S. judges typically do not see them-
selves as the guardian of legal ethics—but rather as the guardian of a 
fair proceeding in the case before them.157 U.S. judges tend to be 
concerned about ethics issues if they affect the integrity of the pro-
ceeding before them. Efªciency is also a concern. 
 The ICTY judges appear to have a broader view of their role to as-
sure legitimacy of the ICTY tribunal. The ICTY judges have captured 
their goals in a variety of cases, describing their role as “to guarantee 
and protect the rights of those who appear as accused before it”158 and 
“ªrst and foremost [an] interest in an outcome that is just, accurate, 
and reasonably expeditious.”159 Their decision to intervene to question 
                                                                                                                      
156 See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 39–41 (2005); McMorrow, supra note 43, at 19–48. 
157 See generally Judith A. McMorrow, Jackie A. Gardina & Salvatore Ricciardone, Judicial 
Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View From the Reported Decisions, 32 Hof-
stra L. Rev. 1425 (2004). 
158 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94–1-A-AR77, Appeal Judgement on Allegations of 
Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, ¶ 19 (Feb. 27, 2001). 
159 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision Afªrming the Registrar’s De-
nial of Assigned Counsel’s Application to Withdraw, ¶ 11 (Feb. 7, 2005). 
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prosecutorial charging discretion, their willingness to create the ADC 
(rather than leave the issue solely to the Registrar), and sanctioning of 
attorneys all support a broader role. Some issues, such as fee splitting 
between defendants and counsel, may not directly affect the quality of 
the advocacy except to the extent that defendants are choosing counsel 
on their willingness to share fees rather than on their legal skill. The 
practice seriously undermines the integrity of the war crimes process by 
allowing defendants to beneªt ªnancially from being charged with a 
war crime. For that reason, the judges intervened. 
 Much of the judicial norm-setting reinforces some basic require-
ments of an adversary system, including an obligation not to present 
false statements, intimidate witnesses, or fail to protect the client’s 
interests in a legally appropriate manner. In the lengthy opinion on 
contempt charges against attorney Milan Vujin, the Court sent a clear 
signal that it will treat credible claims of misconduct—in that case in-
timidating witnesses—seriously. It demanded credible evidence and 
disregarded many pieces of evidence as hearsay. The Court was not 
hesitant to make ªndings of fact against an attorney. In assessing the 
credibility of an attorney, issues of character were clearly relevant.160 
While character and virtue ethics may not be a dominant theme in 
the judicial discussions of attorney conduct, it percolates up in cases, 
such as Vujin and the separate opinion of Judge Jackson in the con-
tempt proceeding against attorney Nobulo. Judge Jackson writes suc-
cinctly that: 
No court can function efªciently without a relationship of 
trust between counsel and the judges. Counsel is an ofªcer of 
the court, and in judicial proceedings quite often a court 
must act on counsel’s word, which, given as an ofªcer of the 
                                                                                                                      
160 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Judgement on Allegations of Con-
tempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, ¶ 130 ( Jan. 31, 2000). The Court wrote: 
[T]he appeals Chamber has also taken into account as relevant to the guilt or 
innocence of the Respondent the evidence which was given as to his character. 
Such evidence is relevant because it bears on the questions as to whether the 
conduct alleged to constitute contempt was deliberate or accidental, and 
whether it is likely that a person of good character would have acted in the way 
alleged. 
Id. 
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court, is accepted as true, unless there is good reason to doubt 
his bona ªdes.161
Trust can be demanded, but ultimately must be earned by all the pro-
fessional actors in this drama—prosecutors, defense counsel, and 
judges. 
Conclusion 
 A judge’s power is awesome. A claim of misconduct is deeply per-
sonal to most lawyers. It is interesting that having spoken with both 
prosecutors and defense counsel on this issue—hardly an empirical 
base, but worthy of some weight—both sides expressed frustration 
that judges seemed to come down hard on their side. This suggests 
that the judges have drawn a correct balance (no one is happy), or 
that perhaps there is room for further conversation. 
 It is striking that in the ICTY’s annual report, the Rules Commit-
tee consists of ªve judges and six non-voting members: two represen-
tatives each from the prosecutor’s ofªce, the Registry, and the Asso-
ciation for Defense Counsel. Other than this Rules Committee, there 
appear to be no structural methods by which the major role actors— 
judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel—sit down and talk to each 
other about larger goals, issues, and tensions inherent in this system. 
Even supposedly structural enemies, like labor and management, get 
together on neutral turf periodically to talk with each other and hu-
manize the enterprise. 
 What would happen if each of the three groups—judges, prose-
cutors, and defense counsel—brought in their top ªve most compel-
ling structural issues and heard what the other side thought? What if 
each was to develop a series of “best practices” and obtain critiques 
from the opposing side? It is inefªcient. It is risky (especially if you do 
not come to agreement). It needs to be done with great caution be-
cause of the concern that the ICTY might “capture” defense counsel. 
But the ICTY is furrowing the ground for future tribunals and it may 
be worth the enterprise. The impetus for such action is likely to be 
the judges because, in the end, the judges in litigation are the true 
gatekeepers of fairness. 
                                                                                                                      
161 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR77, Judgement on Appeal by Anto 
Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt, Separate Opinion of Judge Patrick Robinson, ¶ 2 
(May 20, 2001). 
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